关于新中国成立初期粮食问题的相关研究，目前学界的重心仍放在农村，成果丰硕，相反，城市的粮食问题则尚未引起足够的注意，对中共新政权应对城市粮食问题的举措及其政治运作方面的研究尤其不足。实际上，中共建政伊始，城市的粮食问题极为严峻。其表现为，随着全国基本走向统一，中央政府对国家的管理亦上升到一个全局性的阶段，这使得中共的粮政举措一开始就面临多重困境：其一，亟需应对旧政权遗留下来的粮荒；其二，抑制粮价飞涨刻不容缓；其三，重建粮食市场，规范私商行为，需要立即实施。其四，在保证解放战争所需军食的情况下，还需满足全国人民的常规性粮食供应；其五，1949年、1950年全国各地被灾严重，急需政府拨粮赈灾。对缺乏城市管理经验的新政权来说，如何应对这些困境显然是一个巨大挑战。因为，应对与解决粮食问题，其意义关乎新政权的合法性，更关乎新政权的稳定和巩固。也因此，面对粮食问题所带来的困境，中共采取什么样的措施加以应对，对新政权来说亦是一个重大考验。新政权是如何应对这个困境的?通过研究此问题，可以重新认识中共党史，重新认识新中国初期的历史。 本文选取1949-1956年的天津为考察地点，探讨了中共政权是如何应对粮食问题所带来的困境和考验的。为此，中共相继采取了调粮、平抑粮价、重建粮食市场体系、统购统销、改造私商等措施。其中，第一章是背景介绍，描述了解放前夕天津粮荒蔓延和粮价飞涨严重的局面，分析了粮荒发生的原因及国民党政权应对天津粮荒的措施和实行情况。第二章论述了中共入城后，采取了什么样的措施初步化解了天津的粮食危机。第三章详述了中共进城后，如何重建粮食市场、限制私商，从而成功地确立了政府对粮食市场的主导权。第四章探究了1950年和1952年中共对私营粮食业的两次调整及成效。第五章论述了统购统销实行以后，政府取缔了粮食自由市场，天津市政府各级工作人员是如何执行这一政策的，面对时局之变，粮商、市民有着怎样的行为和心态。第六章论述了天津地方政府对私营粮商的改造情况。 有学者认为，建国初期中共刻意隐瞒了消灭私人资产阶级的“长程”目标，中共的所作所为只不过是权宜之计，实质上中共并无建设新民主主义的足够诚意。笔者以为不然，通过对1949-1956年中共政权对天津粮食问题的应对研究认为，建政伊始，中共确有在一定时期内建设新民主主义社会的目标。以城市的粮食政策为例，建国初期在粮荒蔓延、物价飞涨的严峻局面下，中共最初的打算其实只是想尽快化解粮食危机、稳定物价，之后再按照确立的新民主主义纲领慢慢处理私营粮食业的关系问题。但是，历史的演进常常伴随着起伏波折，意料之外的是，物价稳定之后，私营粮食业却出现了经营困难的局面，为维持私营粮食业的运转，中共不得不进行粮食业的调整，之后的第二次调整，“三反”“五反”运动对粮商的处理，统购统销在城市的实行，私营粮商的社会主义改造，可以说都是中共的被动之举，而非别有用心的刻意而为。 本文的核心结论是，建国初期中共确实认真考虑过实行《共同纲领》中设计的新民主主义经济政策，但从实际政策执行的结果来看，很难说中共真正遵循了以国营经济为领导，同时又与私商“分工合作，各得其所”，对私商“鼓励其经营的积极性，并扶助其发展”的规定，但这依然无法说明中共制定的私人资本主义方略，仅仅是中共的策略性口号。中共对私人资本主义工商业的一系列举措，其实没有预定走向的成分，自始至终就是利用又限制，虽然限制的倾向更为明显，但绝非有一个在几年内将之消灭的计划，更多的还是走一步看一步的做法。大体而言就是，首先解决当下的问题，一个问题解决后，始料未及的另一个问题随之出现，中共只能被动应对。在应对粮食困境方面，亦是如此。直至“五反”的发生，毛泽东才决定“消灭”资产阶级。客观而言，1956年以前中共在城市的粮食政策虽有失误，但总体而言是成功的，中共在没有治国经验的条件下，其治理能力是值得肯定的，当政策受阻后，中共政权的自我调适能力也是比较及时的，往往都能迅速见效。 关键词：中共；新生政权；困境；应对；粮食问题；私营粮商

 In the early years of the founding of New China, the focus of the academic circles is still on the rural areas, and the achievements are fruitful. On the contrary, the food problem in cities has not attracted enough attention. The research on the measures taken by the new CPC regime to deal with the food problem in cities and its political operation is particularly inadequate. In fact, at the beginning of the CPC, the food problem in cities was extremely serious. Its manifestation is that, with the basic trend of national unification, the central government's management of the country has also risen to a global stage, which makes the CPC's grain policy initiatives face multiple dilemmas at the beginning: Firstly, it is urgent to deal with the grain shortage left over by the old regime; Secondly, it is urgent to curb the soaring grain prices; Thirdly, rebuilding the grain market and regulating private merchants' behavior need to be implemented immediately; Fourthly, under the circumstances of guaranteeing the military food needed in the War of Liberation, new regime also need to meet the regular food supply of the people of the whole country; Fifthly, in 1949 and 1950, all parts of the country suffered serious disasters and urgently needed the government to allocate food for disaster relief. For a new regime lacking experience in urban management, how to deal with this dilemma is obviously a huge challenge. Because the significance of dealing with and solving the food problem is related to the legitimacy of the new regime and the stability and consolidation of the new regime. Therefore, in the face of the predicament caused by the food problem, what measures the CPC should take to deal with it is also a major test for the new regime. How does the new regime cope with this dilemma? By studying this issue, we can re-recognize the history of the CPC and the early history of New China. This paper chooses Tianjin from 1949 to 1956 as the research site, and explores how the CPC regime coped with the dilemma and test brought about by the food problem. In order to solve this dilemma, the Communist Party of China has taken measures such as grain regulation, price stabilization, reconstruction of the grain market system, unified purchase and marketing, and transformation of private merchants. The first chapter describes the spread of grain shortage and the serious situation of soaring grain prices in Tianjin on the eve of liberation, and analyses the causes of grain shortage and the measures and implementation of the Kuomintang to solve the problem of grain shortage in Tianjin. The second chapter discusses what measures the Communist Party of China has taken to solve the food crisis in Tianjin after entering the city. Chapter three elaborates on how Communist Party of China successfully established the government's dominance over the grain market by rebuilding the grain market and restricting private merchants. Chapter IV explores the two adjustments and effects of the CPC on the private grain industry in 1950 and 1952. The fifth chapter discusses how the government banned the free market of grain after the implementation of the unified purchase and marketing policy, how the officials implemented this policy, and what kinds of behavior mentality grain merchants and citizens have in the face of the changing situation. Chapter six discusses the transformation of private grain dealers by local governments in Tianjin. Some scholars believe that the CPC deliberately concealed the long-term goal of eliminating the private bourgeoisie in the early days of the People's Republic of China. What the CPC did was only a temporary measure. In essence, the CPC did not have enough sincerity to build a new democratic society. The paper disagrees that, at the beginning of the establishment of the government, the CPC did have the goal of building a new democratic society in a certain period of time. Taking the grain policy of cities as an example, in the early days of the People's Republic of China, under the grim situation of food shortage spreading and soaring prices, the original intention of the Communist Party of China was to resolve the food crisis as soon as possible and stabilize prices, and then slowly deal with the relationship between the private grain industry in accordance with the established new democratic program. However, the evolution of history is often accompanied by ups and downs. Unexpectedly, after price stabilization, the private grain industry experienced a difficult situation. In order to maintain the operation of the private grain industry, the Communist Party of China has had to adjust the grain industry. The second adjustment, the three counter-revolutionaries and five counter-revolutionaries campaign dealt with the grain merchants, the implementation of the unified purchase and marketing in cities, and socialist transformation of the private grain merchants, all can be said to be a passive move of the Communist Party of China, rather than a deliberate act with ulterior motives. The core conclusion of this paper is that in the early days of the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party of China did seriously consider the implementation of new democracy for a period of time. However, as far as the implementation of the Common Programme was concerned, it is hard to say that the Communist Party of China really followed the stipulation of taking the state-owned economy as its leadership while giving consideration to both public and private sectors, and making both labour and capital beneficial. However, this still fails to explain the strategy of private capitalism formulated by the Communist Party of China, which is a slight slogan. A series of measures taken by the Communist Party of China towards private capitalist industry and commerce actually have no intended trend. From beginning to end, they are both utilizing and restricting. Although the tendency of restriction is more obvious, CPC did not plan to eliminate it in a few years. CPC only adopted a step-by-step approach. Generally speaking, it is unexpected to solve the current problems first, after solving a problem, another problem arises. What CPC can do is only reacting passively. Mao Zedong did not decide to eliminate the bourgeoisie until the five counter-revolutionaries movement occur. Objectively speaking, before 1956, the Communist Party of China had made some mistakes in its grain policy in the cities, but on the whole, it was successful. Without the experience of governing the country, its governing ability was worthy of affirmation. When the policy was blocked, the self-adjustment ability of the CPC regime was relatively timely and often made good effects quickly. Key Words: CPC; New regime; dilemma; solve; food problem; private merchants