近年来，政府大力推进行政审批改革，推动大众创业。行政审批作为政府配置资源的重要方式，在计划经济时期发挥过重要作用，随着改革开放不断深入，对市场主体的束缚作用也日益显现。二十世纪九十年代开始，以深圳为代表的部分地方政府尝试探索行政审批改革，放松对市场主体的管制；2001年，行政审批改革在全国推进；2013年新一届政府履职以来，更加强调深化改革，简政放权、优化政务服务，以激发市场活力，实现高质量发展。 基于此，本文旨在回答三个问题：第一，行政审批改革能否促进市场进入？如果能，市场进入率将提高多少？第二，背后的影响机制是什么？行政审批改革是否通过降低市场主体面临的制度性成本，从而促进市场进入？第三，作为改革的主体，地方政府如何推进行政审批改革，以提供更优质的政务服务、更大程度降低市场主体面临的制度性成本？ 至少在我们的知识范围内，还鲜有文献回答这一问题，原因可能有两个。第一个原因是，在理论上，行政审批对企业进入的影响存在两种竞争性的假说。一种是公共利益假说，最早由Pigou (1929)提出。该假说强调，包括行政审批在内的政府管制有助于解决市场失灵问题、促进资源配置。因此，在这种假说下，行政审批改革未必有利于企业的市场进入。另一种假说则是公共选择假说，它强调包括行政审批在内的政府管制会造成资源的错配。比如说，政府可能为了维护在位企业的垄断利润,从而设置严格的管制以阻碍新企业的进入(Stigler，1971)；更甚，Shleifer and Vishny (1993)认为，管制本身就是政府官员向企业征收“过路费”的机制：它不仅会阻碍企业的市场进入，还会造成官员腐败。显然，在公共选择假说下，行政审批改革将有助于企业的市场进入。第二个原因是，实证识别行政审批改革影响市场主体进入的绩效与机制并不容易。具体而言，由于规模以下的企业缺乏系统性统计，很难直接度量市场进入率；同时，对各地行政审批改革、各地市场主体面临的制度性成本，也缺乏系统的度量。 本文分三步回答以上问题。首先，本文考察行政审批改革对市场主体进入的影响程度。在识别方法上，本文基于一个理论模型，证明基于规模临界值测算的企业进入率更具有实用性，从而可以解决规模以下小企业不可观测的问题，直接采用工业企业数据库计算企业进入率。在实证上，本文收集整理全国333个地级和2852个县区设立行政审批中心的数据，实证分析发现，在1998-2007年间，设立行政审批中心的地级市，企业进入率显著提高约2至25个百分点。对企业做进一步划分后发现，这种促进作用主要体现在小规模企业和民营企业进入率的提高。这个发现是相当稳健的，排除进入率可能存在的测度误差、各地创业氛围、对外开放“倒逼”国内市场开放、政府招商引资动机、以及地方官员变更冲击、内生性问题后，依然成立。 接着，本文继续考察行政审批改革促进市场主体进入背后的机制。行政审批改革强调优化政务服务，降低市场主体面临的制度性成本，因此，在识别策略上，本文基于“最多跑一次”改革，采用各地市场主体办事只跑一次的比率度量各地制度性成本。当行政审批改革降低制度性成本，表现为在审批中可以实现只跑一次的市场主体比率增加时，有利于市场主体进入。基于对全国16省、84地市进行实地调研的数据，结果发现，制度性成本越低，市场进入率越高。具体而言，市场主体只跑一次的比率每增加1个百分点，市场进入率增加约0.2至0.5个百分点。这一结果是稳健的，在排除其他可能机制、排除可能内生的样本、并进行工具变量检验后，结果依然存在。 最后，本文考察作为改革的主体，地方政府如何推进行政审批改革，以提供更优质的政务服务、降低市场主体的制度性成本。地方政府提升政务服务水平，对于市场主体而言，就是降低制度性成本。实证结果发现，主动公开政务信息、主动学习先进经验的地方政府，提供的政务服务水平显著更高。具体而言，以工商局网站公开报道“最多跑一次”改革的新闻占比作为地方政府政务公开的代理变量后发现，政府政务公开程度每增加1%，政务服务水平提高约3%至4%；以是否赴改革前沿省份浙江学习考察“最多跑一次”作为地方政府主动学习的代理变量后发现，与未学习考察的城市相比，主动学习的地方政府政务服务水平高约30%至40%。但是，行政审批中心设施投入对政务服务水平的促进作用相当有限。 因此，本文的基本发现是：地方政府主动学习、主动实行政务公开，将有利于提升政务服务水平，降低市场主体面临的制度性成本,从而促进市场主体进入；在1998-2007年间，以设立行政审批中心为例，行政审批改革促进市场主体进入的幅度约为2%至25%；这一发现为公共选择假说提供了中国证据。 本文的边际贡献有三点。(1)在数据上，本文提供了第一手数据，对行政审批改革进行系统性度量。本文使用了两套第一手数据，一是通过实地调研获得的全国16省、84地市的4160份微观调查数据，二是通过公开渠道收集的全国333个地级和2852个县级行政审批中心数据，从而实现对行政审批改革、制度性成本的度量。(2)在理论上，基于公共选择假说和公共利益假说对行政审批改革绩效的两种竞争性观点，本文构建理论模型，实证考察我国行政审批改革的绩效，支持公共选择假说，并进一步贡献了机制检验。(3)本文实证结果发现，我国行政审批改革通过降低制度性成本，显著地提高市场主体进入率。具体而言，在1998-2007年间，以设立行政审批中心度量行政审批改革发现，设立行政审批中心的地级市，进入率显著提高约2至25个百分点；基于市场主体“最多跑一次”的比率度量制度性成本发现，制度性成本每降低1个百分点，进入率增加约0.2至0.5个百分点。这一结果相当稳健，为我国进一步深化改革、实现高质量发展提供支撑。 关键词：经济增长；市场准入；制度性成本

 In recent years, the government has vigorously promoted the reform of administrative examination and approval and promoted public entrepreneurship. As an important way for the government to allocate resources, administrative examination and approval has played an important role in the planned economy period. As the reform and opening up continues, the binding effects on the market subject is increasingly apparent. Beginning in the 1990s, some local governments represented by Shenzhen tried to explore administrative examination and approval reforms and loosen control over market entities. In 2001, administrative examination and approval reforms were promoted nationwide; since 2013, more emphasis is placed on deepening reform, decentralizing power, and optimizing government services to stimulate market vitality and achieve high-quality development. Based on this, this paper aims to answer three questions: First, can administrative reform promote market entry? If so, how much will the market entry rate increase? Second, what is the impact mechanism behind it? Does the administrative examination and approval reform promote market entry by reducing the institutional costs? Third, as the main body of reform, how can local governments promote administrative examination and approval reforms to provide better government services and reduce the institutional costs to a greater extent? At least within our knowledge, there is little literature to answer these questions for two reasons. The first reason is that, in theory, there are two competing hypotheses about the impact of administrative approval on firm entry. One is the public interest hypothesis, first proposed by Pigou (1929). The hypothesis emphasizes that government regulation, including administrative approval, can help solve market failures and promote resource allocation. Therefore, under this hypothesis, the administrative examination and approval reform may not be conducive to the market entry of enterprises. The other hypothesis is the public choice hypothesis, which emphasizes that government regulation, including administrative approval, can cause mismatches in resources. For example, the government may set strict controls to prevent the entry of new firms in order to maintain the monopoly profits of incumbents (Stigler, 1971); moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that regulation itself is a government official levying on businesses. The “passover fee” mechanism will not only hinder the market entry of enterprises, but also cause official corruption. Obviously, under the public choice hypothesis, administrative approval reform will help the market entry of enterprises. The second reason is that it is not easy to empirically identify the performance and mechanism of administrative approval reforms that affect the entry of market entities. Specifically, due to the lack of systematic statistics of enterprises below the scale, it is difficult to directly measure the market entry rate. At the same time, there is a lack of systematic measurement of the administrative examination and approval reforms and the institutional costs for local market entities. This paper answers the above questions in three steps. First of all, we examine the extent of the impact of administrative examination and approval reform on the entry of market entities. The identification method is based on a theoretical model, which proves that the enterprise entry rate based on the scale critical value measurement is more practical. So it can solve the unobservable problem of small enterprises below the scale and directly use the industrial enterprise database to calculate the enterprise entry rate. In the empirical part, this paper collects data on the establishment of administrative approval centers in 333 prefecture-level and 2852 counties in China. The result shows that in the prefecture-level city with established administrative approval center between 1998 and 2007, the enterprise entry rate increased significantly by about 2 to 25 percentage points. After classifying enterprises, this promotion was mainly reflected in the increase in the entry rate of small-scale enterprises and private enterprises.This finding is quite stable. It was still valid after excluding the measurement error may exist in the entry rate, the entrepreneurial atmosphere in various places, the opening up of the domestic market, the motive of government investment promotion, and the impact of local officials on changes and endogeneity. Then, this paper continues to examine the mechanism behind the reform of administrative examination and approval to promote the entry of market entities. The reform emphasizes the optimization of government service and reduces the institutional cost. Therefore, in terms of identification strategy, this paper is based on the “maximum run once” reform and measures the institutional costs by using the ratio of the market entities to run only once in each place. If the administrative examination and approval reform reduces the institutional cost, then the ratio of market entities that can only be ran once in the examination and approval increases, which would be beneficial to the entry of market entities. Based on field surveys data conducted in 16 provinces, 84 cities across the country, it was found that the lower the institutional cost, the higher the market entry rate. Specifically, for every 1 percentage increase in the rate at which market players only run once, the market entry rate increases by about 0.2 to 0.5 percentage. This result is robust and the results persist after excluding other possible mechanisms, possible endogenous samples, and testing for instrumental variables. Finally, this paper examines how the local government can promote administrative approval reforms as a main body of reform to provide better government services and reduce the institutional costs of market players. The improvement of government service by local governments is to reduce institutional costs for market players. The empirical results show that local governments that actively disclose government information and actively learn advanced experience provide significantly higher levels of government service. Specifically, the proportion of news that was publicly reported on the website of the Industry and Commerce Bureau for “maximum run once” reforms as a proxy variable for local government government affairs revealed that for every 1% increase in government openness, government service levels increased by about 3% to 4%. As a proxy variable for local government active learning, whether or not to go to the reform frontier provinces in Zhejiang Province, it is found that the level of local government government service is about 30% to 40% higher than that of cities that have not studied. However, the contribution of the administrative examination and approval center facilities to the level of government service is quite limited. Therefore, the key conclusions are as follows. First, the active learning, active and open administrative affairs of local government will help improve the government service, reduce the institutional costs and thus promote the entry of market entities. Second, in 1998-2007, take the establishing of examination and approval center as an example, the administrative examination and approval reform promote the entry of market subjects by about 2% to 25%, which provides evidence from China for the public choice hypothesis. There are three marginal contributions in this paper. (1) We provide first-hand data and systematically measure administrative reform. This paper uses two sets of data, one is 4160 micro survey data from 16 provinces and 84 cities in the country, and the other is 333 prefecture-level and 2852 county-level administrative examination and approval centers collected through public channels. Thereby achieving the measurement of administrative examination and approval reform and institutional costs. (2) Theoretically, based on the public choice hypothesis and public interest hypothesis on the performance of administrative examination and approval reform, this paper constructs a theoretical model. We empirically examines the performance of China's administrative examination and approval reform, supports the public choice hypothesis and carries out Mechanism test. (3) The empirical results find that China's administrative examination and approval reform significantly increases the market entry rate by reducing institutional costs. Specifically, between 1998 and 2007, by using the establishment of an administrative examination and approval center to measure the administrative examination and approval reform, we found that in the prefecture-level city with the establishment of an administrative examination and approval center, the rate of entry was increased significantly by about 2 to 25 percentage. Based on market entities "run at most once", the ratio measures the institutional cost and finds that for every 1 percentage reduction in institutional costs, the entry rate was increases by about 0.2 to 0.5 percentage. This result is quite stable and provides supportive edvidence for China to further deepen reform and achieve high-quality development. Keywords: Economic Growth; Market Entry; Institutional Cost