2016年爆发的“宝万事件”是中国资本市场上一件具有标志性意义的事件。在该事件中，宝能系通过对各种杠杆资金的组织，尤其是利用结构性资管计划的嵌套，以430亿元人民币收购了万科25％的股权，成为万科第一大股东。在宝能进一步采取相关措施时，受到了万科管理层的抵制，上演了一出收购与反收购的精彩大戏。宝万事件第一次把人们的目光聚焦在杠杆收购上，引起了各界激烈的讨论。这讨论主要围绕三个方面展开，一个是公司治理结构之争，一个是收购行为之争，再一个也就是极其重要的是杠杆资金组织来源之争。人们通过宝万事件认识到资本的威力，在拥有一部分资金的情况下，通过加杠杆提高杠杆倍数，融到足够的资金来购买别的上市公司股票，以此取得被收购公司的控制权，为自己公司战略服务。被收购方管理层则采取相关的反收购措施予以应对，一时间证券市场上硝烟弥漫，说法众多。随着宝万事件尘埃落定，人们逐步回归理性，对宝万事件进行系统梳理，发现其中的问题所在，采取相关的措施加以防范，以更好地促进资本市场的良性发展。笔者以“宝万事件”为切入口，对如何认识上市公司杠杆收购，国外发达国家如何法律规制，杠杆收购资金组织存在的问题，资管计划异化等问题进行了深刻剖析，提出了完善我国上市公司杠杆收购法律制度建议，以期对中国上市公司杠杆收购的发展起到良好的促进作用。 用经济法价值理念分析上市公司杠杆收购合理性是本文的创新点之一。上市公司杠杆收购在欧美国家已日趋成熟，对于中国来说是一个相对较新的事物。如何正确认识上市公司杠杆收购也是一个重要问题。经济法作为我国社会主义法学体系重要组成部门，形成了自己独有的经济法价值体系和理念。经济法的理念在于对经济秩序的维护。对上市公司杠杆收购进行法律规制，体现了经济法价值理念，也就是经济自由与经济秩序的有机统一。之所以这么讲，因为上市公司杠杆收购的存在，对于提升上市公司治理水平、督促公司管理层勤勉尽职、提高公司股东的权益，以及促进金融工具的创新都具有很重要的意义。同时，上市公司杠杆收购也存在着相关的弊端，如诱发收购者只重视短期收益的机会主义行为、损害企业家精神以及引发金融系统风险等。作者通过运用经济法价值理念分析上市公司杠杆收购，结合目前中国经济新常态和杠杆收购的发展特点，旗帜鲜明提出要正确认识上市公司杠杆收购，既要看见它的优点，也要看见它的缺点，不能感性地一味认为它是“门口的野蛮人”、资本市场的“妖精”，采取有力措施趋利避害。 他山之石，可以攻玉。在本文中，笔者重视对国外尤其是欧美国家对上市公司杠杆收购法律制度的研究，尤其是杠杆收购起源国美国的有关法律制度的研究。相对来说，英美国家的资本市场发展更为成熟，融资工具更为丰富，监管经验更加丰富。作者重点阐述了美国上市公司杠杆收购法律制度的起源和发展，简要介绍了包括英国、德国、日本等国家的法律制度现状，探讨了创新金融融资工具以及设立专门用于杠杆收购子公司的可能性，为完善我国上市公司杠杆收购法律制度提供了域外法律借鉴。 而资金组织方式和防范金融风险，是完善上市公司杠杆收购法律制度重点中的重点。“宝万事件”就是明证，宝能系除自有资金以外，通过银行间市场债券、交易所债券、私募股权投资、股票质押、融资融券、收益互换、万能险保费、券商和基金(子)公司的资管计划等筹集了大量资金，并把这些资金以层层嵌套的形式用于上市公司杠杆收购活动。在我国，资产管理业务可以分为证券类(包括基金和期货)、银行类、信托类和保险类资产管理产品。而且根据领域的不同，由相关领域的规范性文件对本领域的资产管理产品的法律关系进行规定。通过认真分析和研究，这些资产管理产品的基础法律关系是信托关系，要接受信托法的规范。但在我国上市公司杠杆收购过程中，各类金融机构和上市公司合作，以刚性兑付为条件，规避金融监管和宏观调控，将资产管理产品分级后层层嵌套，既存在杠杆不清的情况，也在无形中放大了杠杆，谋取大量的不正当利益，对资本市场的安全造成了一定的威胁。笔者认为，在当前大背景下，让各类资金回归本源成为监管层的共识。那么资管计划也要回归本来目的，就是“受人之托、替人理财”，其法律关系是信托，不是委托。在信托关系下，委托人将资金交给受托人也就是计划管理人后，就不能再对计划管理人的行为说三道四，甚至越殂代疱。 在本文中，笔者首先对“宝万事件”进行了回顾，介绍了宝能、万科的基本情况，以及“宝万事件”发生的四个阶段，即宝能强势入驻万科、万科重组预案、监管层介入以及恒大进入万科。在此基础上，提炼出“宝万事件”引发的法律问题争议，即资金组织方式法律问题、反收购法律问题以及公司治理法律问题。 第二章对什么是上市公司杠杆收购进行了论述。按照相关逻辑顺序，对上市公司收购和上市公司杠杆收购的概念、特征进行了阐述，明晰了杠杆在上市公司收购中的作用。再从正反两个角度对国内外相关的理论进行比较，从经济法理念的角度对我国上市公司杠杆收购合理性进行了研究，认为我国对上市公司杠杆收购进行规制，体现了经济法的理念，上市公司杠杆收购在我国是利大于弊的。在经济学理论方面，主要包括降低代理成本、自由现金流、协调理论以及信息改善理论，经济法理念层面则主要体现经济自由与经济秩序的统一，从而保证公司管理层勤勉尽责、改善公司运营效率，提升和保护公司股东利益，并促进金融市场的创新和发展。在上市公司杠杆收购的负面影响方面，主要包括侵害公司利益相关主体、侵害目标公司股东利益、侵害目标公司劳动者以及侵害目标公司债权人等；潜在风险则包括诱发获取短期收益的机会主义行为、损害公司及其创始人的企业家精神以及引发系统性金融风险。 第三章论证了中国上市公司杠杆收购资金构成法律监管现状。首先研究我国上市公司杠杆收购的发展及特点，包括我国上市公司杠杆收购的发展、我国上市公司杠杆收购与资本市场发展之间的关系以及我国上市公司杠杆收购监管制度的发展。其次，本文认为对于上市公司杠杆收购需要持有积极谨慎的态度，深入研究其作用和出发点，发挥其优势，避免其劣势。同时，还从银行业、证券业、保险业角度论证了杠杆资金的组织情况，论证了主要的杠杆资金形式以及各类杠杆资金层层嵌套可能引发的风险。第四章主要从世界上已发生的五次收购浪潮和正在发生的第六次上市公司收购浪潮，从英美法系、英美法系国家对上市公司杠杆收购法律监管进行了比较研究，提出了对完善中国上市公司杠杆收购的启示。 第五章则是通过对上述四章的论证，提出了完善公司法、信托法、证券法等方面的法律建议。主要包括切实规范收购者行为；完善信托法使资产管理计划回归信托本质；采用实质认定标准来区分资产管理产品和银行借款；完善证券法推行“功能监管”统一同类资产管理产品的监管标准；联动修改公司金融法设计专门从事杠杆收购的子公司；上市公司杠杆收购监管应为创新金融产品预留空间。 最后一部分结论认为，在结合供给侧改革的大背景下，上市公司杠杆收购要充分发挥其有利作用，规避其不利影响，要避免“脱实向虚”，要为实体经济服务；通过穿透式监管、强制披露收购人诚信信息及收购历史以及控制杠杆率，能够有效规范杠杆收购；资管计划要回归“专家理财”，是信托不是委托，进一步限制结构化资管计划的发展；要充分强化信息披露制度，修改证券法和金融法等相关法律，允许建立子公司专门用于上市公司杠杆收购，使累积资金清晰明了。文章采取理论论证与时事相结合的方式，以求能够有效推动我国上市公司杠杆收购法律制度完善，进一步助力供给侧结构性改革，增加市场活力。 关键词：上市公司；杠杆收购；资金组织方式；穿透原则；资产管理

 The “Baoneng-Wanke Event” happened in 2016 is still a hot issue in our capital market and its significance lasts for long time. By using the different financial instruments as the tools to collect more than 43 billion yuan, especial the nesting of structural asset management plan, the Baoneng has become the major shareholder of Wanke by acquiring 25% shareholding thereof and faces the resistance from management of Wanke when further step is planning.The event, deemed as a wonderful drama of takeover and anti-takeover, firstly attracts the attention on LBO and inspires hot discussion of which the following three points are very essential: the discussion on corporate governance, the discussion on anti-takeover measurement as well as the discussion on sources of fund of LBO. The event makes us know the power of capital from which the people without enough fund can gain enough funds by the leverage to “prize” other companies so as to acquire the controlling status of the listing companies and makes them serve for the strategies of the company. The management of the acquired companies can use anti-takeover measurements to resist from which the capital market has violent smoke and lots of rumors. With the end of the “Baoneng-Wanke Event”, people start to analyse this event rationally and it is the time to summarize the whole event, find the problems exsiting, and take meardurements to prevent the recurrence of the event alike to promote the positive development of the capital market. By the opportunities provided by the “Baoneng-Wanke Event”, this paper makes deep research and discussion on the legal issues of LBO with regard to the source of fund, the takeover activities as well as the corporate governance. The aim of the research is to make reasonable suggestions on the legal system and make positive effect to the LBO in our country. The first innovative point in this paper is to analyze the rationality of the LBO with the value concept of economic law. The LBO has matured in Europe and the United States and is a relatively new thing for China. How to correctly understand the LBO is also an important issue. The idea of economic law is to maintain the economic order. The legal regulation of LBO embodies the value concept of economic law. That is the organic unity of economic freedom and economic order. The existence of LBO is of great significance for improving the governance level of listed companies, urging the management of companies to be diligent and dutiful, improving the rights and interests of shareholders of companies, and promoting the innovation of financial instruments. There are also related disadvantages in the LBO, such as inducing acquirers to pay attention only to short-term profits, damaging entrepreneurship, and triggering financial system risks. The author analyzes the leveraged acquisition of listed companies by using the value concept of economic law. In combination with the new normal of the Chinese economy and the development characteristics of leveraged acquisition, the author clearly makes suggestion on understanding the LBO correctly. We must not only see its advantages but also see its disadvantages. The idea to think the LBO as a "wild barbarian at the door" or a "leprechaun" in the capital market makes us know taking strong measures to avoid harm is necessary. The stone of other mountains can attack jade. In this article, the author stuides the legal system of LBO abroad, especially in Europe and the United States. In contrast, the capital markets in Britain and the United States are more mature, financing tools are more abundant, and regulatory experience is more abundant. The author focuses on the origin and development of the legal system of LBO in the United States, briefly introduces the current legal system of countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, and discusses the possibility of innovative financial financing tools and the establishment of special use for leveraged buyout subsidiaries. It provides some references to improve the legal system of leveraged acquisition of listed companies in China. The key point of improving the legal system of LBO is how to organize capital and prevent financial risk. In addition to its own funds, the Baoneng Department has raised a large amount of funds through inter-bank market bonds, exchange bonds, private equity investments, stock pledges, margin bonds, income swaps, Universal insurance premiums, brokerage firms, and fund(sub-) company management plans, etc.. And these funds are nested in layers for the LBO. In our country, asset management business can be divided into securities (including funds and futures), banking, trust and insurance asset management products. Moreover, according to the different fields, the legal relations of asset management products in this field are stipulated by the normative documents in the relevant fields. Through careful analysis and research, the basic legal relationship of these asset management products is a trust relationship and is subject to the norms of trust law. However, in the process of LBO in China, various financial institutions and listed companies cooperate to avoid financial supervision and macro-regulation on the condition of rigid payment, and nested asset management products in layers after classification. Furthermore, with the invisible magnification of leverage and a large number of illegitimate interests raised the security of the capital market has caused threat. The author believes that under the current background, all kinds of funds need to be suitably regulated and the consensus of the supervisory layers to desigh the regulatory framework is important. Then the capital management plan must also return to its original purpose, which is to "accept the trust of others and manage money for others." Its legal relationship is trust, not entrustment. Under the trust relationship, after the trustee hands over the funds to the trustee, the plan manager can no longer criticize the plan manager's behavior, or even become more and more awkward. This paper firstly goes back to the whole story of “Baoneng-Wanke Event”, introducing the basic information of Baoneng and Wanke as well as the four stages of this story, namely the eagerly inclusion of Baoneng, the reorganization plan of Wanke, the intervention of regulator and the participation of Henda. Based on the study above, the paper summarizes the legal disputes presented in this event, that is. the organizational form of asset management, the takeover and anti-takeover and corporate governance. The second chapter discusses what the LBO is and studies the definitions and the features of leverage. Moreover, this chapter also studies the takeover of listing companies as well as the LBO one by one logically and summarizes the domestic and overseas theories presented from positive and negative perspectives with the purpose to clarify the LBO. The economic theories include decreasing the agency cost, free cash flow, coordination theory and information difference theory, the economic law theory is the reflection of economic freedom nd economic order. The aim of these theories is to make management board loyalty and care, improve the efficiency of company operation, protect the rights of shareholders and spur the further development and innovation of financial market. The negative impacts of LBO include the potencial infringement on the stakeholders, the shareholders, workers and creditor; the potential risks are opportunism to gain short-term interests, loss to the founder and entrepreneurship and cause of systematic risk. The third chapter focuses on the development of LBO in China. The writer firstly studies the development of LBO in China, including the history of LBO, the relationship between LBO and capital market, and the regulatory framework of LBO in China. Then the writer studies the rationality of the LBO of listed companies in China from the perspective of economic law, and believes that China's regulation of LBO of listed companies reflects the basic value of economic law. Listed companies' leveraged buyouts in China have more advantages and less disadvantages. Additionally, I also make research on the source of fund in different industries, such as banking, securities and insurance. Then we go to the potential risks from the organizational forms and interconnection of different asset management. In the fourth chapter, I mainly conducted a comparative study of the law of LBO of listed companies from the Anglo-American law system and the Continental law system countries in the wave of five acquisition waves that have occurred in the world and the sixth wave of acquisitions of listed companies that are taking place. The enlightenment of LBO to Chinese listed companies also demonstrated in the final part of this chapter, aiming to do good to the development of LBO of Chinese listed companies. The fifth chapter puts forward legal proposals in corporate law, securities law, trust law through the arguments of the above four chapters. The proposals include, setting rigid regulation of the activities of acquirers, clarifying the legal nature of the asset management is trust legal relationship by amending trust law, the standard to discern the lending activities and asset management shall use the substance one, amending securities law to make clear the functional regulation is essential to unify the regulatory standard of asset management, with the amendment of corporate law, the SPV is useful to collect fund used in LBO, the regulation of LBO shall guarantee the space to financial innovation. The conclusions of the paper are presented as follow: with the background of structural reform of the supply-side, the LBO shall serve for the needs of real economy by playing a suitable role, not evading the adversely effect and not deviating from the real economy; the measurements to regulate the LBO can include pass-through account supervision, the mandatory disclosure of intergrity information and aim of former M&A activities as well as the regulation of leverage ratio;the asset management plan shall accord with the “expert managing the wealth” function and the nature of the asset management plan is trust while not agency from which can promote the further development of the asset management plan; the information disclosure system shall be emphasized with the aid of the revision of securities law and financial law and the permission of establishment of SPV to the LBO which makes the fund collected more clear. The article adopts a combination of theoretical analysis and case study in order to effectively promote the legal system of LBO for listed companies in China, further assist supply-side structural reforms, and increase market vitality. Key words: listing corporatios; LBO; sources of fund; penetration principle; asset management