作为分散农业风险和保障农民收入的重要工具,农业保险正逐渐成为我国主要农业风险管理手段之一。在中央和地方政府财政的大力补贴下,我国农业保险迅速发展,已经成为我国农业风险管理体系和农产品支持政策的重要组成部分。这要求,农业保险的政策目标不仅仅是分散农业生产风险,更是推动我国农业转型、保障粮食安全的重要政策,在实施乡村振兴战略中发挥更为重要的作用。2018年中央“一号文件”也明确要求农业保险不仅增加保险品种,也要扩大保险覆盖面,即增品,扩面,提标,增效,发挥更广泛的功能和作用的要求。在此背景下,弄清当前农业保险政策对农业生产的影响及其机制,以及考察农业保险政策是否实现其政策目标具有重要的现实意义,这一结果对进一步完善我国未来农业保险制度与农业支持保护体系至关重要。 基于此,本研究紧紧围绕农业保险对农户生产行为的影响展开,并重点回答以下问题:我国当前农业保险政策是否会影响农业产出及收入?如果是,会产生何种影响?以及农业保险影响农业产出及收入的机制与途径是什么?基于此,农业保险是否能够实现其政策目标?对我国农业保险的发展以及相关政策的完善有何参考意义? 为回答上述问题,本文主要在全面梳理和总结我国农业保险政策及其运行机制的基础上,构建我国农业保险的理论分析框架,从理论上深入剖析农业保险对农户生产行为的影响机制。并基于理论模型,设定了计量经济模型,从实证上研究农业保险对农户生产行为的影响。具体而言,主要通过计量经济模型,分析了农业保险对农户单产水平、净利润水平、要素投入水平和技术采纳行为的影响,并系统分析其影响机制。 本文所用数据为2015年基于我国黑龙江、浙江、河南和四川四省粮食主产区农户调查数据。具体而言,主要采用分阶段随机抽样方法从四省共抽取1039个水稻和玉米种植户。为了分析农业保险影响的微观机制,本研究主要基于地块层面数据进行分析。因此,研究进一步从每户经营土地中抽取两个样本地块。但是由于部分农户只有1个地块,最终获得1707个样本地块。 研究结果表明:首先,我国农业保险对农户单产水平没有显著影响,但能提高农业生产效率和农民收入。主要是因为农业保险优化了农户生产要素配置,从而降低了生产成本;但是要素变动并没有提高单产水平,主要是因为农业保险在增加农户技术采纳行为的同时,也减少了部分要素投入。例如,农业保险能够在一定程度上降低化肥、农药和劳动力投入,但是能够增加采纳新技术的概率。正是如此,农业保险提高了农业生产效率,弥补因为要素投入减少给农业生产带来的负面影响。其次,农业保险的影响呈现规模异质性,农业保险能够显著规模户的生产行为,但对小农户没有显著影响。这与我国农业保险运行机制密切相关。由于我国现行政策性农业保险按照“低保障、广覆盖”的原则推行,而且农险公司设定了起赔或免赔条款以抑制农户的道德风险,而且在实际理赔过程中,存在保险公司赔付不规范的现象,存在保险公司与农户“合谋”现象,导致参保小农户的生产行为没有发生变化;但在此过程中,规模户由于土地数量多且集中,在争取赔付资金中有足够博弈能力和话语权争取到足够的赔付资金,因而更愿意调整生产行为。 基于上述研究结果,本文得出以下研究结论。第一、我国农业保险对农业单产水平没有显著影响,难以发挥保障粮食安全作用;第二、农业保险能够提高我国农业生产效率和农业收入,有效保障农民收入;第三、我国农业保险能够显著影响大规模农户的生产行为,但对小农户生产行为没有显著影响,其风险保障需求难以满足;第四、我国农业保险中存在较强的道德风险问题,特别是规模户,道德风险效应更为明显;第五、我国农业保险具有正的环境外部性,能够显著降低农户的化肥和农药投入,并提高农户采纳保护性耕作技术概率。 根据研究结论,本文提出以下政策建议。第一、提高农业保险的风险保障水平,真正发挥农业保险的保障作用,一方面要开展商业化农业保险、农业巨灾保险以及再保险,完善农业风险管理体系;另一方面,要规范农业保险公司赔付机制,严防保险公司与农户“合谋”行为。第二、根据不同类型农户的保险需求,提供差异化农业保险产品。第三、开发指数保险等新型产品,控制道德风险。第四、建立农业保险与其他环境保护政策的联动机制,以为我国未来进一步完善农业保险政策提供有益参考。 关键词:农业保险;生产行为;农业产出;要素投入;技术采纳
As an important tool to mitigate agricultural risks and protect farmers' income, crop insurance is gradually becoming one of the main agricultural risk management strategies in China. Under the heavy subsidies of the central and local governments, China's crop insurance has developed rapidly and has become an important part of China's agricultural risk management system and agricultural product support policies. This requires that the policy objective of agricultural insurance is not only to diversify agricultural production risks, but also to promote China's agricultural transformation and ensure food security, and play a more important role in implementing the rural revitalization strategy. In 2018. the "No. I Document" also explicitly required agricultural insurance not only to increase the types of insurance, but also to expand insurance coverage, that is, to increase products, expand the surface, raise the standard, increase efficiency, and play a wider range of functions and functions. Against this background, it is of great practical significance to clarify the impact of current agricultural insurance policies on agricultural production and its mechanisms, and to examine whether agricultural insurance policies achieve their policy objectives. This result will further improve China's future agricultural insurance system and agricultural support. The protection system is crucial. This study focuses on the impact of agricultural insurance on farmers' production behavior and thus the following questions. Does China's current agricultural insurance policy affect agricultural output and income? If so, what effect will it have? And what are the mechanisms and ways in which agricultural insurance affects agricultural output and income? Based on this, can agricultural insurance achieve its policy objectives? What is the reference significance for the development of China’s agricultural insurance and the improvement of relevant policies? In order to answer the above questions, this paper mainly constructs a theoretical analysis framework of agricultural insurance in China based on the China's agricultural insurance policy and its operational mechanism, and theoretically analyzes the impact mechanism of agricultural insurance on farmers′production behavior. Based on the theoretical model, the econometric model is set up to empirically study the impact of agricultural insurance on farmers' production behavior. Specifically, it mainly analyzes the impact of agricultural insurance on farmers' yield level, net profit level, factor input level and technology adoption behavior through the econometric model, and systematically analyzes its impact mechanism. The data used in this paper is the survey data of farmers in the main grain producing areas of Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Henan and Sichuan in 2015. Specifically, a total of 1,039 sample households were randomly selected from four provinces using a staged random sampling method, both of which were rice and corn growers. In order to analyze the micro-mechanism of agricultural insurance impact, this study is mainly based on parcel level data analysis. Therefore, the study further extracted two sample plots from each household's land. However, since some farmers have only one plot, 1,707 sample plots are finally obtained. The results show that: first, China's agricultural insurance has no significant impact on the yield level, but it can improve agricultural production efficiency and farmers' income. Mainly because agricultural insurance optimizes the allocation of production factors of farmers, thus reducing production costs; however, the change of factors does not increase the level of yields, mainly because agricultural insurance has reduced the input of some factors while increasing the adoption of technology by farmers. For example, agricultural insurance can reduce fertilizer, pesticide and labor input to a certain extent, but it can increase the probability of adopting new technologies. As such, agricultural insurance increases agricultural production efficiency and compensates for the negative impact of reduced production of inputs on agricultural production. Secondly, the impact of agricultural insurance presents the heterogeneity over scale. Agricultural insurance can significantly reduce the production behavior of large-scale households, but has no significant impact on small farmers. This is closely related to China's agricultural insurance operation mechanism. Since China's current policy agricultural insurance is implemented in accordance with the principle of “low security, wide coverage”, and agricultural insurance companies set up compensation or deductible clauses to curb the moral hazard of farmers, and in the process of actual claims, there are “collusion” between insurance companies and farmers, which has resulted in no change in the production behavior of small-scale farmers. However, in this process, large-scale households have enough ability and power to fight for compensation and obtain sufficient compensation funds because of the large amount of concentrated land, and therefore more willing to adjust production behavior. Based on the above research results, the paper draws the following research conclusions. First, China's agricultural insurance has no significant impact on the level of agricultural yields, and it is difficult to play a role in ensuring food security. Second, agricultural insurance can improve China's agricultural production efficiency and agricultural income, and effectively protect farmers' income. Third, China's agricultural insurance for small farmers has no significant impact on production behavior, and it’s difficult to meet their needs for risk protection. Fourth, there are strong moral hazard problems in China's agricultural insurance, especially for iarge-scale households, the moral hazard effect is more obvious. Fifth, China's agricultural insurance has a positive environment externality, and can significantly reduce farmers' fertilizer and pesticide use and increase the probability of farmers adopting conservation tillage techniques. According to the research conclusions, this paper proposes the following policy suggestions. First, improve the risk protection level of agricultural insurance, and truly play the role of agricultural insurance. On the one hand, it should carry out commercial agricultural insurance, agricultural catastrophe insurance and reinsurance, and improve the agricultural risk management system; on the other hand, regulate agricultural insurance companies to prevent the "collusion" between the insurance company and farmers. Second, provide different agricultural insurance products according to the demand of different types of farmers. Third, develop new products, such as index insurance, to control moral hazard. Fourth, establish a linkage mechanism between agricultural insurance and other environmental protection policies to provide a useful reference for China to further improve its agricultural insurance policy in the future. Key words: Agricultural insurance; production behavior; agricultural output; factor input; technology adoption.