全球范围的节能减排政策以及智能电网建设，使得可再生能源与电力需求响应措施得到广泛关注和利用。同时，各类需求响应措施与可再生新能源扶持政策的实施，将对寡头竞争的电力市场参与者的行为策略和整个市场的竞争结果产生重要影响。研究这些影响机制将有助于完善电力市场设计，并对改进电力市场竞争效率具有理论和现实意义。在此背景下，本文基于寡头竞争均衡理论，开展了考虑需求响应措施和可再生能源扶持政策的电力市场均衡模型研究，并分析不同需求响应资源和可再生能源扶持政策对市场参与者竞争策略以及整个市场竞争均衡结果的影响。丰要工作与创新贡献如下： 首先，为了研究可中断负荷措施对电力市场竞争的影响，提出了一种计入可中断负荷的电力市场需求模型，并在此基础上分别建立了考虑可中断负荷的批发市场古诺竞争均衡模型与供应函数竞争均衡模型。针对计入可中断负荷后均衡模型的非光滑性，提出了一种求解方法。算例分析研究了可中断负荷量、中断阈值价格以及不同竞争模式对发电商报价策略以及电力市场均衡结果的影响，并表明：(1)引入可中断负荷资源可以有效降低批发市场价格及其波动性，特别是当需求不确定性相对较大或需求价格弹性相对较小时，这种效果更明显。(2)可中断负荷量与中断阈值价格对市场均衡结果具有重要影响，较大的可中断负荷量与较小的中断阈值价格更有利于降低批发市场价格及其波动性。(3)在古诺竞争模式下实施可中断负荷项目，更有利于降低批发市场价格及其波动性，缓解发电商的市场力。这是本文的主要创新点之一。 其次，为了研究可中断负荷措施对可再生能源发电波动性的缓解作用，建立了一个考虑可中断负荷的含风电电力市场均衡模型，并引入条件风险价值(CVaR)作为风险评估工具，研究了可中断负荷项目对含风电电力市场均衡结果以及发电商风险的影响。算例仿真表明：(1)可中断负荷资源可以有效缓解由可再生能源并网引起的批发市场价格波动，并降低批发市场价格，尤其当风电不确定性较大时，效果更明显。(2)可中断负荷资源可以为传统发电商缓解风险提供一种有效途径。 第三，假设灵活用户可以通过需求响应聚合商直接参与批发市场竞争，分别建立了需求响应聚合商古诺竞争模式与供应函数竞争模式下的电力市场均衡模型。通过引入一个特殊约束条件，可同时计入负荷转移资源与负荷削减资源。对于模型求解中出现的非线性互补问题，采用非线性互补方法进行求解。研究表明：(1)需求响应资源参与市场竞争可以有效鼓励灵活用户将负荷需求从高峰转移到低谷，降低峰谷差。(2)同时拥有负荷转移资源与负荷削减资源的需求响应聚合商在市场竞争中拥有更强的竞争力。(3)从平滑负荷曲线的角度，需求响应聚合商以古诺竞争模式参与时效果较好；从平滑价格曲线的角度，需求响应聚合商以供应函数竞争模式参与时效果更明显。这也是本文的一个重要创新点。 最后，建立了一个考虑寡头绿色证书市场与电力批发市场的两阶段联合均衡模型。在第一阶段，所有可再生能源发电商以供应函数竞争模式参与绿色证书市场竞争。在第二阶段，所有发电商以古诺竞争模式参与批发市场竞争。该均衡模型最后可以归结为一个具有均衡约束的均衡问题，并采用非线性互补方法进行求解。研究表明：(1)可再生能源发电商会根据配额变化在两个市场中以不同的方式行使市场力。当配额较低时，可再生能源发电商会选择在绿色证书市场中持留证书来行使市场力；当配额较高时，可再生能源发电商会通过减少批发市场出力来行使市场力。这些策略性行为都会导致证书价格与电力批发市场价格上升。(2)面对较高的证书价格，理性的传统化石燃料发电商会选择降低批发市场出力，进而降低对证书的需求，降低证书市场价格与证书购买成本。(3)可再生能源发电商发电成本的降低，可以有效降低绿色证书市场与电力批发市场的价格，缓解发电商的市场力，促进电力市场的健康运行。这也是本文的一个主要创新点。 关键词：电力市场，均衡模型，需求响应，可再生能源扶持政策

Due to the worldwide energy conservation and emission reduction policies and the development of smart grid, demand response and renewable energy gain wide attention and application around the world. Meanwhile, the implementation of various demand response programs and renewable energy support policies will certainly have great effects on the market participants’ strategic behaviors and the overall electricity market competition outcomes. Researches on these influence mechanisms will be conducive to improve the design of the electricity market, and be of important theoretical and practical significance to improve the electricity market competition efficiency. Under this background, based on oligopolistic competition equilibrium theory, this dissertation commits to study the electricity market equilibrium models considering demand response programs and renewable energy support policies, and address the problems of what impacts of the introduction of demand response programs and renewable energy support policies will have on the market participants’ strategic behaviors and the whole electricity market equilibrium outcomes. The main work and the key contributions of this dissertation are as follows: Firstly, to investigate the impacts of interruptible load (IL) program on the electricity wholesale market competition, a novel demand model is proposed to incorporate the IL program. On this basis, the Cournot and supply function equilibrium models are presented for wholesale markets with IL program, respectively. The introduction of IL program leads to a non-smooth equilibrium problem. To solve this equilibrium problem, a novel solution method is proposed. The simulation examples are proposed to examine the impacts of interruption volume, interruption threshold price and different competition modes on the generation firms’ bidding strategies and the equilibrium outcomes of electricity wholesale market. The simulation results show that: (1) With the IL program, the electricity price and its fluctuation can be lowered. This effect becomes more obvious when the uncertainty of market demand is relatively large or the demand elasticity is relatively low. (2) The interruption volume and interruption threshold price have significant influence on the electricity market equilibrium outcomes. The relatively large interruption volume and the relatively low interruption threshold price are more helpful to reduce the electricity price and its fluctuation. (3)Under the Cournot competition mode, implementing IL program is more helpful to reduce the electricity price and its fluctuation, and mitigate the market power of generation firms. This part is one of the key contributions of this dissertation. Secondly, to study the impacts of IL program on alleviating the fluctuation of renewable energy, a Cournot equilibrium model for the wholesale market with IL program and wind power is presented. The conditional value-at-risk is used to measure the market risk of the generation firms, the impacts of the IL program on the equilibrium outcomes of electricity wholesale markets with wind power and generation firms’ risk are examined. The simulation results show that: (1) Implementing IL program can reduce the electricity price and its fluctuation caused by the integration of wind power. Especially when the uncertainty of wind power output is relatively large, this effect is more obvious. (2) IL program is an effective way for generation firms to mitigate their risks in the wholesale market with wind power. Thirdly, assume that the flexible consumers are allowed to take part in the wholesale electricity market competition in the form of demand response (DR) aggregators, the Cournot and supply function equilibrium models are build, respectively. Load shifting and curtailing programs can be incorporated at the same time by a special constraint. The nonlinear complementarity approach is used to solve this equilibrium problem. Numerical examples show that: (1) The DR resource joined the market competition can effectively encourage the flexible consumers to shift the load from peak-periods to off-peak-periods, and reduce the difference between peak and valley. (2) For DR aggregators, the DR aggregators with load shifting and curtailing resources are more competitive in the wholesale electricity market. (3) For flattening the system load curve, the model of DR aggregators with Cournot mode is better, and for flattening the electricity price curve, the model of DR aggregators with supply function mode is superior. This part also is one of the key contributions of this dissertation. Finally, a two-stage joint equilibrium model considering the tradable green certificate (TGC) market and wholesale electricity market is proposed. In stage one, the renewable firms behave a la supply function mode in the TGC market, and in stage two, all generation firms behave a la Cournot mode in the wholesale market. This equilibrium model can be formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and is solved by the nonlinear complementarity approach. It is shown that: (1) Renewable firms will exercise market power in two markets by different ways. When the RPS is relatively low, renewable firms tend to hold back some of TGCs in the TGC market to exercise market power; when the RPS is relatively high, renewable firms turn to cut down their output in the wholesale market to exercise market power. These strategic behaviors can raise both the TGC and electricity prices. (2) Facing increasing TGC price, strategic fossil fuel firms choose to reduce their output in the wholesale market, so as to reduce the demand of TGCs, bring down TGC price and TGCs purchasing cost. (3) The generation cost reduction of renewable firms can lower both TGC and electricity prices, and mitigate the market power of generation firms in two markets, which has positive impacts on the market operation efficiency. This part is one of the main contributions of this dissertation. Keywords: electricity market, equilibrium model, demand response, renewable support policies